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Abstract
A fundamental maneuver in autonomous space operations is known as rendezvous,
where a spacecraft navigates to and approaches another spacecraft. In this case study, we
present linear and nonlinear benchmark models of an active chaser spacecraft performing
rendezvous toward a passive, orbiting target. The system is modeled as a hybrid automaton,
where the chaser must adhere to different sets of constraints in each discrete mode. A
switched LQR controller is designed accordingly to meet this collection of physical and
geometric safety constraints, while maintaining liveness in navigating toward the target
spacecraft. We extend this benchmark problem to check for passive safety, which is collision
avoidance along a passive, propulsion-free trajectory that may be followed in the event of
system failures. We show that existing hybrid verification tools like SpaceEx, C2E2, and
our own implementation of a simulation-driven verification tool can robustly verify this
system with respect to the requirements, and a variety of relevant initial conditions.
1 Introduction
A new age of deep space exploration is underway with several ongoing public-private partnerships.
A groundwork for a possible mission to Mars in the 2030s is also underway [16]. Autonomous
operations where a spacecraft can operate independent of human control in a wide variety
of conditions are essential for deployment, construction, and maintenance missions in space.
Despite many spectacular successes like the Mars landing of the Curiosity rover, ensuring
safety of autonomous spacecraft operations remains a daunting challenge. The cost of failures
can be extreme. For example, NASA’s DART spacecraft was designed to rendezvous with the
MUBLCOM satellite. In 2005, approximately 11 hours into a 24-hour mission, DART’s propellant
supply depleted due to excessive use of thrusters, and it began maneuvers for departure. In the
process it collided with MUBLCOM; it met only 11 of 27 mission objectives, and the failure
resulted in a loss exceeding $1 million. In another incident, a navigation error caused the Mars
Climate Orbiter to reach as low as 57 kilometers, where it was intended to enter an orbit at
an altitude of 140-150 kilometers. The spacecraft was destroyed by the resulting atmospheric
stresses and friction and the cost incurred was $85 million. These incidents, and several others
in [21] highlight the consequences of failures in space applications and demonstrate the need for
more rigorous testing before deployment.
Although formal verification has played an important role in design and safety analysis of
spacecraft hardware and software (see, for example [10] and the references therein), they have
not been used for model-based design and system-level verification and validation. In this paper,
we present and verify a realistic and challenging spacecraft maneuver problem called autonomous
rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (ARPOD). The original hybrid control design
problem and its variants are introduced by Jewison and Erwin in [13]. ARPOD is a fundamental
set of operations for a variety of space missions such as on-orbit transfer of personnel [20],
resupply for on-orbit personnel [17], assembly [22], servicing, repair, and refueling [9].
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The basic setup for ARPOD consists of a passive module or a target (launched separately
into orbit) and a chaser spacecraft that must transport the passive module to an on-orbit
assembly location. The chaser maintains a relative bearing measurement to the target, but
initially it may be too far away from the target to use its range sensors. Range measurements
become available within a given range, giving the chaser accurate relative positioning data so
that it can stage itself to dock the target. The target must be docked with a specific angle of
approach and closing velocity, so as to avoid collision and ensure that the docking mechanisms
on each body will mate. Furthermore, the docking procedure must be completed before the
chaser goes into eclipse and loses vision-based sensor data. Finally, it is necessary for the system
to ensure passive safety . That is, the chaser spacecraft should maintain safe separation from the
target even if it loses power and communication during its mission.
In this paper, we present a suite of hybrid models for the rendezvous portion of the ARPOD
mission that can serve as benchmarks for verification tools and serve as building-blocks for more
complex operations. We present nonlinear models that consist of nonlinear orbital dynamics
(NLinProx and NLinProxTh) and linearized models (LinProx and LinProxTh) using the Clohessy-
Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) equations [1]. The rendezvous operation is further subdivided into two
phases: Proximity Operations A and B, such that phase A captures an interval of larger ranges
than the interval of ranges in phase B. In other words, the chaser enters phase A first and as
it moves closer to the target, it enters phase B. After this two-phase rendezvous, the chaser
enters a docking phase/maneuver (i.e. when the chaser is less than 10 meters from its target).
We disregard the requirements for this phase for this paper. We develop a switched state-
feedback controller using Linear Quadratic Regulation (LQR) for the rendezvous phases. The
position-triggered transitions brought about by the switching controller are urgent, resulting in
a deterministic hybrid automaton. However, we extend the ARPOD problem in [13] to include
the passive safety requirement by introducing a nondeterministic time-triggered transition to
the passive mode.
We have successfully verified the requirements for most of the models using existing hybrid
verification tools SpaceEx [8] and C2E2 [3, 5], and also our new MatLab implementation of a
simulation-driven verification algorithm (SDVTool) for linear hybrid models. SDVTool improves
C2E2’s reachability algorithm, with a new technique [4] for obtaining reachsets for linear systems.
We obtain verification results for an array of varied initial state configurations and passive
transitions times to show the robustness and limits of the switched LQR controller. The
experiments, in particular on the passive safety requirement, have demonstrated a weakness in
simulation-driven verification approaches in handling ill-conditioned models which suggest a
need for further research. Overall, we believe that our results and approaches establish feasibility
of system-level verification of autonomous space operations, and they provide a foundation for
the analysis of more sophisticated maneuvers in the future.
2 Related work
There are few academic works on system-level verification of autonomous spacecraft. A survey
of general verification approaches and how they may apply to small satellite systems is presented
in [12]. Architecture and Analysis Design Language (AADL) and verification and validation
(V&V) over AADL models for satellite systems have been reported in [2]
An feasibility study for applying formal verification of autonomous satellite maneuvers is
presented in [15]. That approach relied on creating rectangular abstractions (dynamics of the
form x˙ ∈ [a, b]) of the satellites dynamics through hybridization and verification using PHAVer [7]
and SpaceEx [8]. The generated abstract models have simple dynamics but hundreds of locations,
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and also, the analysis is necessarily conservative. In contrast, the approaches presented in this
paper work directly with the linear (nonlinear) hybrid dynamics.
The ARPOD challenge [13] has been taken up by several researchers in proposing a variety
of control strategies. A two-stage optimal control strategy is developed in [6], where the
first part involves trajectory planning under a differentially-flat system and the second part
implements Model Predictive Control on a linearized model. A supervisor is introduced to
robustly coordinate a family of hybrid controllers in [18]. Safe reachsets (i.e. ReachAvoid sets)
are computed for the ARPOD mission in [11] and used to solve for minimum fuel and minimum
time trajectories.
3 Spacecraft Rendezvous Model
In this section, we present the detailed development of the hybrid models. First we present the
orbital dynamics of the spacecraft in Sections 3.1-3.2. Then in Sections 3.3-3.4 we present a
hybrid controller. Finally, we state the various mission constraints in Section 3.5.
3.1 Nonlinear relative motion dynamics
The dynamics of the two spacecraft in orbit—the target and the chaser—are derived from
Kepler’s laws. We use the simplest case for relative motion in space, where the two spacecraft
are restricted to the same orbital plane, resulting in two-dimensional, planar motion. The so
called Hill’s relative coordinate frame is used. As shown in Figure 2, Hill’s frame is centered on
the target spacecraft, with +iˆ-direction pointing radially outward from the Earth, +kˆ-direction
normal from the orbital plane, and +jˆ-direction completing a right-handed system. We further
assume that the target moves on a circular orbit, and thus, the jˆ-direction aligns with the
tangential velocity of the target.
The restriction on the target’s orbit implies that the target-centered frame rotates with
constant angular velocity. We will assume the target is in geostationary equatorial orbit (GEO),
so its angular velocity is n =
√
µ
r3 , where µ = 3.698×1014m3/s2 and r = 42164km. The chaser’s
position is represented by the vector xi+ yj, and the chaser’s thrusters provide acceleration in
the form of Fxi+ Fyj. The following equations are derived using Kepler’s laws and constitute
the nonlinear model of the spacecraft dynamics.
x¨ = n2x+ 2ny˙ +
µ
r2
− µ
r3c
(r + x) +
Fx
mc
,
y¨ = n2y − 2nx˙− µ
r3c
y +
Fy
mc
,
(1)
where rc =
√
(r + x)2 + y2 is the distance between the chaser and Earth and mc = 500kg is the
mass of the chaser.
3.2 Linear dynamics
Linearization of these equations about the system’s equilibrium point results in the Clohessy-
Wiltshire-Hill (CWH) equations [1], which are commonly used to capture the relative motion
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dynamics of two satellites within a reasonably close range. These equations are:
x¨ = 3n2x+ 2ny˙ +
Fx
mc
,
y¨ = −2nx˙+ Fy
mc
.
(2)
Let the state vector be denoted by ~x = [x, y, x˙, y˙]T . The state-space form of these linear
time-invariant (LTI) equations is:
~˙x = A~x+B~u, where,
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
3n2 0 0 2n
0 0 −2n 0
 , B =

0 0
0 0
1
mc
0
0 1mc
 , ~u = [FxFy
]
.
3.3 Hybrid controller model
Complete hybrid automaton models for the system with additional documentation are available
from from this link1. Varying ranges of the relative distance between the spacecraft give rise to
different constraints and requirements, and therefore, require separate controllers. We present a
two-stage hybrid controller for achieving the rendezvous maneuver2. We refer to these discrete
stages as modes. Each discrete mode has an invariant which specifies the conditions under
which the system may operate in that mode, which we will first describe in words.
Mode 1 or Proximity Operations A (ProxA): the chaser is attempting to rendezvous and its
separation distance (ρ =
√
x2 + y2) from the target is in the range 100-1000m.
Mode 2 or Proximity Operations B (ProxB): the chaser is attempting to rendezvous and its
separation distance is less than 100m.
Mode 3 or Passive mode: the chaser is no longer attempting to rendezvous and is not using its
thrusters, regardless of its separation distance. The system may transition to the Passive
mode as a result of a failure or loss of power.
The state of the overall hybrid system is defined by the mode and the valuations of a set
of continuous variables: relative position x, y, thrusts Fx, Fy, and a global timer clock . There
are two timing parameters of the model t1 and t2 that specify the time interval over which the
chaser spacecraft may enter the Passive mode. When the system is in a particular mode, the
continuous variables (x, y) evolve according to the (linear or nonlinear) differential equations
of the previous section. The thrust inputs Fx and Fy are computed according the full-state
feedback controller designed in Section 3.4.
We refer to the time elapsed in the mission with the variable clock but do not consider
it an explicit state variable. The invariants in each mode can be more precisely described as
ρ ≥ 100 and clock ≤ t2 for mode 1, ρ ≤ 100 and clock ≤ t2 for mode 2, and clock ≥ t1 for mode
3. A transition from one mode to another is described by a guard. When the state satisfies
the guard condition, the system may take the transition. If a transition is required to occur
as soon as possible, this is a called an urgent transition. In this system, the distance-based
1https://tinyurl.com/verifysat
2The rendezvous mission presented in this paper is a subset of the four-stage problem presented in [13]. Our
two stages of rendezvous are almost identical to “Phase 2” and “Phase 3” in [13].
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ProxA:
˙¯x = (A−BK1)x¯
ProxB:
˙¯x = (A−BK2)x¯
Passive:
˙¯x = Ax¯
x¯0 ρ ≤ ρt
ρ ≥ ρt
clock ∈ [t1, t2]
clock ∈ [t1, t2]
(a)
i
j
ρt = 100m
(b)
Figure 1: (a) Hybrid model for spacecraft rendezvous, with linear flow equations shown. The
invariants in ProxA and ProxB are defined exclusively by the chaser’s position, as shown by
corresponding colors in the plane of motion in (b). The transition guards between ProxA and
ProxB align exactly with their invariant sets, resulting in urgent transitions. The invariant for
Passive mode is clock > t1, irrespective of position. A transition to Passive occurs sometime
within an interval of time, and hence is nondeterministic. In (b), the octagon represents how
the invariants/guards are approximated and modeled in the verification tools.
Figure 2: Hill’s relative coordinate frame.
The chaser’s relative position vector is xˆi+yjˆ.
i
j
ρ
60◦
Figure 3: The hybrid model (see Figure 1a)
captures the chaser’s motion in ProxA (blue)
and ProxB (green), and we use verification
tools to show that whenever ρ ∈ ProxB, the
chaser does not leave the LOS region (red).
transitions between modes 1 and 2 are urgent. However, the transitions to mode 3 (Passive
mode) are not urgent. There is an interval of time, clock ∈ [t1, t2], within which the chaser could
nondeterministically transition to the Passive mode. Roughly, a larger [t1, t2] interval implies a
bigger passive-safety envelope for the mission. These transitions to the Passive mode make the
system nondeterministic. Indeed, for some choices of this interval, it is possible for the hybrid
system to occupy any one of the three modes at a given time.
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3.4 Linear Quadratic Control
We have developed a full-state feedback controller, namely, a Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR),
to drive the chaser towards the target’s position. Closed-loop feedback is desirable because the
system can measure and adjust for errors, and ultimately guarantee liveness (i.e. eventually
the target will be reached). LQR is specifically chosen because it is constructed by minimizing
a quadratic cost function, which we can choose so as to roughly satisfy our safety constraints.
LQR is only applicable to linear systems, so we design the control for the linearized model in (2),
but we will use the same control with nonlinear dynamics (1) when applying verification tools.
The form of an LQR solution is: ~u = −K~x, where K ∈ R4×2 is a constant matrix and
~u = [ Fxmc ,
Fy
mc
]T . The K matrix is found by minimizing the following cost function with respect
to ~u:
∫∞
0
(~xTQ~x+ ~uTR~u)dt, where Q and R are positive definite matrices.
Given the form of the control law, we update the definition of the model given in (2) to the
following:
x¨ =
(
3n2 − k11
mc
)
x− k12
mc
y − k13
mc
x˙+
(
2n− k14
mc
)
y˙,
y¨ = −k21
mc
x− k22
mc
y −
(
2n+
k23
mc
)
x˙− k24
mc
y˙.
(3)
These equations are the expanded version of the closed-loop form shown in Figure 1a. Later,
we will discuss why we distinguish between the dependence of (2) on ~x and ~u and (3) on only ~x.
Bryson’s method [14] is used to help determine an appropriate cost function. Begin with
Q and R as diagonal matrices, and choose their values so as to normalize each of the state
and input variables. In other words, choose the diagonal elements so that Qii =
1
max(x2i )
and
Rii =
1
max(u2i )
. Here, the denominators refer to the largest desired value of each variable,
which will be determined by the safety constraints and mode invariants. While the LQR gains
are obtained with our constraints in mind, the resulting controller does not guarantee these
constraints are never violated. This is why further verification is still required. This design
process is repeated for modes 1 and 2, and the result is two distinct LQR controllers for each of
these modes in our hybrid system.
3.5 Constraints and safety requirements
In this section, we enumerate the properties that define a safe and successful mission, and how
they are modeled for verification tools.
Thrust constraints During the rendezvous stages (ProxA and ProxB), the thrusters cannot
provide more than 10N of force in any single direction, therefore, we have the constraints:
|Fx|, |Fy| ≤ 10.
LOS cone and proximity During close-range rendezvous ProxB, the chaser must remain
within a line-of-sight (LOS) cone (see Figure 3), and its total velocity must remain under
5cm/s, so
√
x˙2 + y˙2 ≤ 5cm/s. The total velocity constraints cannot be exactly modeled
using linear constraints, and a polytopic approximation over x˙, y˙ is used. This is done in
the same way as
√
x2 + y2 ≤ ρt is approximated (see Figure 1b).
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Separation During the Passive mode, the chaser must avoid collision with the target, which is
theoretically a point mass at the origin. Even in a theoretical model, a small ball or box
should be used to bound this point to account for limitations in numerical precision. In
reality, the target satellite’s dimensions may range from the order of 1m to 100m, so the
size of this bounding box will vary depending on the situation. We use a box with a 0.1m
circumradius.
4 Verification approaches
In this section, we briefly discuss our experience in using hybrid system verification tools.
SpaceEx [8], is a well-established reachability analysis tool for linear and affine hybrid systems.
It implements the support function-based reachability algorithm, includes the PHAVer algorithm
for rectangular dynamics [7], and also a simulator for nonlinear models. The support function
representation of sets is amenable to effective computation of convex hulls, linear transforms,
Minkowski sums, etc.—operations that are necessary for safety verification.
C2E2 [3, 5] is a simulation-driven bounded verification tool for nonlinear hybrid models.
The core algorithm of C2E2 relies on computing reachset over-approximations from validated
numerical simulations and what are called discrepancy functions. A discrepancy function for a
model bounds the sensitivity of the trajectories of the hybrid system to changes in initial states
and inputs. Candidate discrepancy functions can be obtained using a global Lipschitz or using a
matrix norm for linear systems. However, typically these approaches give discrepancy functions
that blow-up exponentially with time, and therefore, are not useful for verifying problems with
long time horizons. The automatic on-the-fly approach implemented in [5] uses bounds on the
Jaobian matrix of the system to get tighter local discrepancy functions and it has been used to
verify several benchmark problems. Recently the tool has been extended to handle nonlinear
models with dynamics with exponential and trigonometric functions.
For a (possibly nonlinear) mode with x˙ = f(x(t)), the discrepancy computed by the algorithm
of [5] uses the Jacobian matrix J(x) of f(x) and the condition number of J(x0) evaluated at
certain points x0 in the state space. For ill-conditioned matrices, such as what we have in
the passive mode, (the A-matrix representation of (2)), the over-approximation error may still
blow-up. Ill-conditioned systems may not only arise from passive dynamics but also from
extremely large and small coefficients appearing together in J(x0).
In order to address this problem, we have created a MATLAB implementation of C2E2’s
verification algorithm (SDVTool) for linear models. Unlike C2E2, SDVTool does not rely on
discrepancy, but instead computes the reachable states under a given linear mode directly. The
particular algorithm implemented is the one presented in [4]: For an n-dimensional system,
n + 1 simulations are performed. From these simulations, special sets called generalized star
sets, are generated to represent the exact reachsets. For our purposes, a generalized star set is
represented by a pair 〈x0, V 〉, where x0 ∈ Rn is the center state and V = {v1, ..., vn} ⊆ Rn is a
standard basis (not necessarily unit vectors), and the set defined by 〈x0, V 〉 is
{x ∈ Rn | ∃α1, . . . , αn ∈ [−1, 1], x = x0 +
n∑
i=1
αivi}.
As reachsets are calculated for time steps, x0 and V are transformed. When the reachtube
from a given mode intersects the guards for a transition, the star sets are aggregated and
over-approximated with hyperrectangles. If R∗i =< x(ti), Vi > is the star set reachset obtained
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at time ti, then the hyperrectangular reachset is:
Ri = {x | x ≤ x(ti) +
n∑
j=1
max(−vj , vj)
and x ≥ x(ti) +
n∑
j=1
min(−vj , vj)}.
C2E2 and SDVTool currently accumulates all the reachable sets in ProxA and ProxB that
may transition to Passive, and uses their convex hull to begin reachset computations under the
Passive mode. It follows that if the time interval during which a transition may occur is large,
then the initial set of states under the Passive mode is large, making it very difficult to prove
safety. One solution is to allow partitioning and refinement of the initial passive mode set. Since
this is not currently implemented in C2E2 or SDVTool, we restrict our experiments to transition
interval lengths of 5 minutes or less. For example, checking if the system is safe for a transition
clock ∈ [50, 200 min] could be achieved by running several experiments with small subintervals
that cover the original interval.
5 Verification results
In this section, we discuss and compare verification results from SpaceEx, C2E2, and our
implementation of SDVTool. Based on these results, we reach the broad conclusion that with
some manual tweaks, the current hybrid system verification tools are indeed capable of analyzing
realistic system-level properties of autonomous spacecraft maneuvers.
In the following presentation, we pick arbitrary model parameters, but to a large extent our
results are robust with respect to parameter variations. That is, the parameters can be tuned to
the specific requirements of a real mission.
For subsequent discussion, we label our models as follows: LinProx denotes the equations
in (3), NLinProx denotes the equations in (1) with the same controller as LinProx substituted
into Fx, Fy, and LinProxTh denotes a model that will soon be introduced to account for explicit
thrust values.
5.1 Hybrid safety proofs
Figure 4 shows the typical reachset computations obtained from SDVTool, C2E2, and SpaceEx
on the LinProx, LinProxTh, and NLinProx models. These computations also establish the safety
of the corresponding systems with respect to the requirements in Section 3.5. Overall, the plots
show that the reachsets from the different tools are qualitatively similar. From the more detailed
MatLab plots we can check that no part of the reachable sets intersect with unsafe regions. It is
clear from the zoomed in portion of Figure 4a that a reasonably larger collision region would
violate safety.
In C2E2 and SpaceEx, each safety property is loaded and checked individually. In C2E2,
the running time for a single property for the nonlinear model NLinProx is in the neighborhood
of 5-10 minutes; in SpaceEx, the running time for a single property is on the order of a few
seconds. SDVTool checks all (12) properties simultaneously and the running time varies from
around 30 seconds to 10 minutes. We do not compare absolute running times in further detail
in this paper as each of the tools have different semi-automatic workflows and require widely
different execution environments.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: Examples of various generated reachsets. Reachable positions using LinProx in SDVTool
shown in (a) and SpaceEx in (b). Reachable velocities using LinProx in SDVTool shown in (d)
and SpaceEx in (e). Reachable positions of NLinProx without Passive mode in C2E2 shown in
(c). Reachable thrusts using LinProxTh in SDVTool is shown in (f).
Time horizon Timing is obviously critical for space applications to ensure there is sufficient
fuel, but with over-approximated reachability, we can only guarantee the mission is completed
within a time upper-bound. This upper-bound obtained from reachability analysis may differ
significantly from the actual mission time. Therefore, we do not impose any strict completion
requirements. Instead, we choose a time horizon that is representative of what we might expect
in practice, and focus on observing what behaviors are possible within these limits. Typically,
Proximity A operations take 1-5 orbits (at under 4 hours an orbit) and proximity B operations
take 45-90 minutes [19]. We choose a sum of approximately 4.5 hours to be our time horizon.
Initial states We calculate a set of initial states assuming that the chaser spacecraft is
performing the encompassing mission from [13]. We choose an initial set radius of [25m, 25m, 0, 0]
around the point ~x0 = [−900m,−400m, 0m/s, 0m/s]T . This can be interpreted as uncertainty
in the chaser’s initial position, typically due to loss of precision from sensors and computations,
or it can be used to explore multiple initial states of interest. We have successfully verified
scenarios with uncertainty in the velocity dimensions as well.
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Unsafe sets For SpaceEx, C2E2, and SDVTool, we model the safety requirements as a
collection of linear inequalities. The LOS cone is approximated with a triangle, so we check
three properties to prove the system remains within LOS constraints, and so on. Max thrust is
effectively a one-dimensional constraint, a nonconvex interval, so two properties will capture the
unsafe set for each thrust input (one along x-direction, one along y-direction). But in order to
treat it this way, we must introduce extra variables ux, uy to explicitly track the thruster values.
These extra variables are the difference between LinProx and LinProxTh.
Passive transition time The interval of time during which a transition to the passive mode
may occur is trivially bounded by the mission time horizon. For this first example, we choose a
small interval at [120, 125min]. This ensures that the chaser will operate in mode ProxB before
transitioning to the passive mode.
5.2 Adding thrust constraints
In Section 3.5, we described a constraint on thrust that mimics the physical limitations of
our spacecraft. We now set up the 6-dimensional model LinProxTh so that we can verify this
additional requirement. We introduce ux, uy as explicit state variables, and solve for their
differential equations to obtain:
u˙x = k11x˙+ k12y˙ + k13x¨+ k14y¨,
u˙y = k21x˙+ k22y˙ + k23x¨+ k24y¨.
(4)
There are two equivalent numerical models that will produce different over-approximated
reachsets. The first model consists of (4) and the following:
x¨ = 3n2x+ 2ny˙ − ux
mc
,
y¨ = −2nx˙− uy
mc
.
(5)
Here x¨ and y¨ account for the effects of thrust inputs by explicitly adding ux, uy. Since each
dimension is over-approximated in the reachset computation and ux, uy are functions of position
and velocity, the computation for subsequent reachable sets of position and velocity have even
more uncertainty. Roughly, ux, uy act as filters for x, y, x˙, y˙, adding distortion and introducing
more uncertainty. Figure 5 shows the effects of these compounding errors. The overarching
verification algorithm will partition the initial set to reduce errors stemming from the data
structure, but it will have to do this numerous times and may time out in practice.
The second 6-dimensional model (a variant on LinProxTh) consists of (3) and (4). In this
case, x¨ and y¨ implicitly calculate the thrust, and ux, uy are independent “tracking” variables.
The calculations for x¨ and y¨ are equivalent to those in (5), but they bypass the “filter” when
constructing reachsets. The results are identical to those shown in Figures 4a-4d, with the
addition of reachable sets of thrusts shown in Figure 4f.
Once again, our choice of data structure introduces some uncertainty to the explicit represen-
tation of the initial set of ux, uy values. This is propagated throughout the analysis. We use the
(3)-(4) model to obtain safe thrusting results from SDVTool. The fine reachable sets in Figure 4f
show that the LQR controller operates well within the thrust constraints (|ux|, |uy| ≤ 10N).
10
Verification of Autonomous Spacecraft Rendezvous N. Chan and S. Mitra
Figure 5: Coarse overapproximation of
the reachable positions, when using the 6-
dimensional LinProxTh model from Equa-
tion 5.
Figure 6: Initial positions (with zero initial
velocities) of LinProx that have been verified
to be safe. They are safe for Passive transition
times up to the time shown by the color map.
5.3 Robustness of verification
To demonstrate the robustness of the verification approaches (and the designed controller),
we performed several experiments varying the initial set and passive transition times with the
LinProx model.
The scenarios that guarantee a safe mission are summarized in Figure 6. Roughly, choosing
an initial position or subset of positions within the shaded region will result in a safe mission for
a transition time or interval within [0, T ], where T is the time corresponding to the color at that
initial position(s). For these experiments, we consider initial separation between the chaser and
the target to be near 1000m, where this LQR control would start being used. We assume the
initial chaser velocity to be zero. Generally, we can conclude that, the closer to the x-axis the
chaser starts, the later the chaser may safely abort to the passive mode. On the other hand, the
neighborhood of states along ∼ 230◦ are not safe for a passive transition at any time.
6 Conclusions and future directions
In this case study paper, we present a sequence of linear and nonlinear, nondeterministic
benchmark models of autonomous rendezvous between spacecraft with several physical and
geometric safety requirements. We designed an LQR controller and verified its safety across
the different models, a variety of initial conditions, parameter ranges, and using three different
hybrid system verification approaches. The models and requirements are made available online.
This case study, and in particular the requirement for passive safety, has shed light on the
weakness of simulation-driven verification in handling ill-conditioned models.
The results provide a foundation for verifying more sophisticated maneuvers in future
autonomous space operations. For example, we proposed a continuous full-state feedback
controller, but it is also possible to consider a situation where full state measurement is not
possible and a simple bang-bang controller is required. Control theory tells us that this system
maintains marginal stability which implies that errors will never recede, so for reasonably-sized
initial sets, the reachable sets may not satisfy tight constraints such as LOS.
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